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Bostock’s Paradox:
Intersections in LGBTQ Employment Rights
and Private, Religious Businesses
Christopher P. Smith1

Introduction
Since the early 1970’s, the burgeoning LGBTQ civil rights movement has resulted in the progression of the freedoms and privileges
that LGBTQ individuals can now enjoy. Same-sex marriage was
legalized in 2015, and as of 2020, workplace protections have been
extended to those who are LGBTQ. However, certain exemptions
exist for both religious institutions and businesses owned by religions.
These exemptions exist because the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution protects the right to the free exercise of religion.
This includes protecting how religions hire ministers and secular, nonreligious workers such as accountants or building custodians.
Inevitably, the difference between both the protections afforded
to religious institutions and LGBTQ employment leads to a paradox
regarding LGBTQ employees since they are currently supposed to
be offered the same workplace protections as those who are discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, religion, age, and disability. At the same time, they are not offered similar protections when
working for an employer who, by legal standards, is considered a
private religious business. However, with the introduction of a new
legal precedent set forth by Bostock v. Clayton County, although religious institutions themselves can continue to discriminate against
1
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LGBTQ employees, private, religious businesses must follow the
same jurisdiction as secular, non-religious businesses, meaning they
can no longer discriminate against LGBTQ employees.

I. Background
To understand the legal problems that surround by the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, one must first understand: (A) the nature of religious freedom according to current legal
jurisprudence in the United States of America, (B) the history and
current understanding of private business practice in the United
States today, and (C) the history of civil rights for LGBTQ persons
in the United States.
A. Religious Freedom in the United States of America.
As it pertains to freedom of religion, the First Amendment to the
Constitution established that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”2 The free exercise of religious belief is a pivotal part American rights, in conjunction with the right to redress, and the right to
free assembly. Therefore, knowing how the government can interact
with religions and religious employers is crucial to understanding
the First Amendment’s relationship to Bostock v. Clayton County.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC established a definition to determine who is a minister: a
preaching member of a faith whose position allows them the opportunity to educate either a member of the public or someone within
the faith about the faith’s beliefs and ideals. This ruling was established to protect ministers from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which protects a certain status of employee. This idea is essential because Title VII allows religious institutions to bar certain
types of employees from participating as ministers, meaning that a
religious institution could discriminate against potential employees
if they were to be serving a ministerial function within the institution.
2

U.S. Const. amend. I
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While a ministerial exemption was established when Title VII was
passed into law, Tabor was the first time that the ministerial exemption was examined within a court of law.
B. Rights of Private, Religious Businesses
In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act3 that reduced the scope of Employment Division
v. Smith, a landmark ruling that reduced a private religion’s power to
discriminate in hiring employees. The act also included a definition
separating religions from “[p]rivate, closely-held businesses of and
guided by religious principles.”4 A private business is any business
owned by a single-person, or a select group of people and is not
owned by stockholders in a stock-exchange. A closely-held business
is any business that is kept within a very small group of people,
such as a family unit. A recent example of a conflict over such a
business is the 2014 case of Burwell vs Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.5,
wherein the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rights of businesses like
Hobby Lobby (that are guided by Christian religious principles) to
deny birth control and abortion coverage to its employees because of
the company’s closely held religious values.
C. LGBTQ Civil Rights in the Workplace
Finally, to begin to unravel the paradox brought on by Bostock v.
Clayton County, one must understand the history of LGBTQ Civil
Rights. In 1967, the United States legislature passed the 1967 Civil
Rights Act.6 Incorporated into this law was Title VII, which served
to protect the working rights of minority groups. Specifically, Title
VII states:

3

107 U.S.C. §1488 (1993).

4
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5
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*1 (2014).

6

Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).

158

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 35, 2021

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7
While same-sex marriage has been legal since 2015, and an equal
right initiative for LGBTQ persons has been ongoing since 1970,
it was not until 2020 that equal workplace protections for LGBTQ
employees were codified by the United States Supreme Court through
Bostock v. Clayton County. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Gorsuch wrote
that “These terms generate the following rule: An employer violates
Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based
in part on sex. It makes no difference if other factors besides the
plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision or that the employer treated
women as a group the same when compared to men as a group.”8
Because of this ruling, LGBTQ employees now benefit from the
same protections as other classes protected by Title VII. In addition
to workplace protections for sex, race, and political preference, individuals cannot be discriminated against for their sexual orientation.
To protect LGBTQ employees as required by Bostock vs. Clayton County, private religious businesses should be required to follow the ruling of Bostock and not deny working rights to LGBTQ
employees, regardless of their status as private, religious businesses.
7

78 U.S.C. §241 (1964).

8
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II. Unraveling the Bostock Paradox
The claim of freedom to work must come from Title VII, as it is
the vehicle by which all protected persons receive the right to work.
As stated previously, Title VII declared in subsection 703 that it is
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against employees on the
basis of certain protected statuses. Such discrimination would be a
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1971. However, there is nothing stated within the text of Title VII that explicitly protects LGBTQ employees from discrimination. As of June of
2020, there have been numerous changes allowing for protections
of employment and workplace behavior thanks to Bostock. Bostock
makes no distinction between sex and LGBTQ rights; to Bostock,
they are one and the same. A man being discriminated against for
his love for another man is experiencing discrimination because of
his gender since a woman would not be treated the same way if she
were in love with a man. Thus, Bostock makes firm the notion that
LGBTQ employees have rights like any other person. However, this
ruling makes no explicit distinction between which organizations
are exempt and which are not; therefore, we cannot yet rule that private religious businesses can feasibly be required to obey this law
since they are currently allowed a couple of notable exemptions that
would hinder the protection of LGBTQ employees.
The primary and most important exemption is the right of any
religious employer to require an employee to follow their religious
standards. Under Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,9 four employees were fired because
of their non-compliance in upholding the religious temple standards
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The men argued
that the Church of Jesus Christ’s use of section 702, which allowed
for the church to hire and fire according to religious belief, was not
only spurious, but that it violated the Constitution entirely since the
men were performing non-religious, secular work. The Supreme
Court’s unanimous decision declared that section 702 did not violate
9

Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, No. 86-179, JUSTIA 483 U.S. 327, at
*1 (1987).
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the Constitution and determined that any religious institution has the
right to require a person to follow its religious tenets. This case had
a broad impact on case law regarding the ministerial exemption that
had been previously ruled-under in Hosanna-Tabor.10
Second, according to Hosanna-Tabor, religious institutions also
have a right to select their own ministers.11 While Tabor employed
a specific four-fold measure to help decide who or who was not a
minister, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, a
2020 case, stated that it was not the place of a court nor any government entity to set a specific, hard rule about the ministers of a
religion since doing so would violate the First Amendment.12 Mrs.
Morrissey-Berru had filed a complaint against the private catholic
school where she had taught. The school had in 2012 required teachers to become certified in catechist teaching, something Mrs. Morrissey-Berru could not do as she was not a practicing catholic. The
Supreme Court decided to undo the precedent set by Hosanna-Tabor
by removing the ministerial test and instead following a more simplistic model.13 As a result, courts could rule on a case-by-case basis,
but in general would assume that a person was a minister rather than
not. Because of this, protecting LGBTQ employees outright in a religious institution regardless of the work that they were performing at
the time would be almost impossible because all employees working
for a religious institution would be at the discretion of the religion.
Another problem that arises when examining current law surrounding religious rights and employment can be found in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 (RFRA). The key text of
this act reads: “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
10

Id.

11

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Commission, No.10-553 JUSTIA 565 U.S. 171 at *3 (2012).

12

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, No. 19–267 591 U.S. at
*6 (2020).

13

Id. at *6 (2020).
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without compelling justification.” 14 This reasoning was contrary to
the at-the-time recent reasoning of Employment Division v. Smith,15
which stated that no religion nor religious person could refuse to
obey a law that was neutral to anyone. This reasoning came from
two men who had used illegal substances as part of their religious
faith. While the use of these substances was considered fair use for
their beliefs, the Supreme Court determined that religious belief
could not outweigh the needs of the law.
While the constitutionality of the RFRA has been challenged in
later court cases, subsequent laws passed have allowed the essential
core of the RFRA that has been cited previously to remain. One such
important piece of context is the restoration of the Sherbert test16 in
determining the burden that government might place upon religious
individuals. This test calls for a strict scrutiny of any and all applicable laws and rulings, requiring the law to be as narrowly tailored
to provide for as much religious freedom as possible. Finally, the
government may not burden any individual (and in legal context, a
business constitutes an individual just as a person does) on their free
exercise of religion.17 Therefore, it may seem that a private religious
business is exempt from following Bostock because Bostock places
a burden upon the privately held belief of a business. This seems to
be the case in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,18 where the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby.
However, as we will discuss further in this paper, this does not
apply to non-religious, but privately religious businesses like Hobby
Lobby. Because there is an inherent distinction between private,
religious-oriented businesses and a religious institution, the result is
that the law cannot be applied in the same way. To explore this, we
will examine Hobby Lobby as it is related to Deseret Book.

14

107 U.S.C. §1488 (1993).

15

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. (1990).

16

107 U.S.C. §1488 (1993).

17

Id.

18

Burwell, 573 U.S. at *1-*95.
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To relate back to our previous case in Amos, let us examine the
differences found between a business owned by a religion and that
of a private, religious business. There are important distinctions to
note about Hobby Lobby versus Amos in dealing with religion. Let us
examine first a business that might seem like Hobby Lobby: Deseret
Book is a private bookstore and publishing company owned by the
Deseret Management Corporation, which in turn is owned by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It is operated separately
from the rest of the Church, maintaining its own CEO and retaining a unique style and brand. Hobby Lobby is privately owned by a
family that maintains a core set of religious values that governs how
the store operates. While it might initially appear similar to Hobby
Lobby, as both organizations are founded upon religious principles,
because of their business structure, they function differently according to the law. Because Deseret Book is religion-owned, it is legally
governed through religion law, and therefore precedents like Amos
are applicable to Deseret Book. Unlike Deseret Book, Hobby Lobby
is a private business and therefore the laws that govern it will diverge
from Deseret Book. While Deseret Book can appeal to its subsidiary
position underneath the Church of Jesus Christ as a shield from laws
like Bostock, Hobby cannot as it is a private business.
Second, Lobby is restricted to just the Health and Human Services Department. Quoting Justice Alito: “We do not hold...that forprofit corporations and other commercial enterprises can opt out of
any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their
sincerely held religious beliefs.”19 According to Alito, private, religious businesses are not allowed to opt out of any law they choose
and must obey any laws that do not directly conflict with their rights
to religious freedom, such as in the case with Hobby Lobby.
Third, we can compare a concurrent case with Bostock. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes Inc.20 is a similar case to that of our Hobby Lobby
example. R.G. is a privately-held, closely-held religious business that
19

Id. at *9 (2014).

20

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc., 884 F.3d at 560. (2018).

Bostock’s Paradox: Intersections in LGBTQ
Employment Rights and Private, Religious Businesses

163

runs its operations similar to Hobby Lobby. It had previously fired
an employee because of their transgender status. While the Supreme
Court had withheld from determining if these rules also applied to
religions themselves, they did affirm that transgender employees
were protected under Title VII. 21
Requiring religious, private businesses to not discriminate
against LGBTQ employees according to Bostock would not impose
a significant burden upon these businesses. Unlike Lobby, where the
court had concluded that the financial burden of paying for birth
control was a significant burden, no such burden exists when dealing with LGBTQ employees. However, financial burdens are not the
only burdens that can be laid upon a business; thus, it is possible
to argue that requiring a private religious business to hire LGBTQ
employees would be a burden upon the free exercise of a business to
spread their religious message. Even so, in reviewing R.G. & G.R.,
a key aspect of their business model stands out. The United States
5 Circuit Court of Appeals had argued that requiring a transgender
employee to remain in R.G.’s employ was injurious to the beliefs
and practice of R.G. Contrary to this, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the 5th Court’s mandate.22 While the Supreme Court
acknowledged the religious question raised by R.G, they ruled
in favor of the employee, recognizing the lack of burden that the
employee had placed upon R.G citing it as not “substantial enough”
to fail the Sherbert test. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that
this same measure can apply to any other religious, private business.
While protecting LGBTQ employees from willful termination by
their religious employers might place a burden, it is not significant
enough to raise any questions regarding the RFRA.
As civil rights have pushed toward progress on behalf of LGBTQ
people, the need for protections for LGBTQ employees has become
an important issue. However, legal freedoms carry little weight if
they are not supported by protections from discrimination. Therefore, the compelling nature of this issue makes it important to
solve. Due to the lack of reasoning behind refusing to hire LGBTQ
21

Id.

22

Id. at *37.
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employees, the fact that the Sherbert test is not an issue, and that our
test case of R.G. and G.R. passes the Sherbert test, we can conclude
that there is no reason that private, religious businesses can deny
employment to LGBTQ employees.

III. Impact And Issues
The impact of Bostock, as I have described, is significant namely
for how the divide between religious freedom and LGBTQ rights
are working in contrast to expose the more difficult and nuanced
questions regarding the limits of freedom of religion and the need to
preserve the rights of all Americans. A significant movement of conservative-leaning legal thinkers would concur that ruling as I have
argued above would narrow the current scope of the “free exercise”
clause. It is true that what has been given above would result in a
more nuanced interpretation of the RFRA and redefine the meaning
of the question between the free exercise of a religious business as
it relates to non-discriminatory practice. For some, this may pose a
problem because of how they interpret the First Amendment.
Regardless, it would be incorrect to treat a private, religious
business the same as a religious institution itself. Although their
motives may be aligned, they are inherently different at their core.
While such a ruling, as has been argued, would have ramifications
for religious businesses and raise further questions that have been
previously discussed by the Supreme Court (in cases like Lobby),
these questions would hopefully lead to further nuanced discussions
about such rights.

IV. Conclusion
It is significant to recognize the value that Bostock has given to current
LGBTQ employees today. Thanks to Bostock, LGBTQ employees
now are free to work without fear of discrimination. The dreams
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are more open to such
employees. With thanks to the First Amendment as interpreted in
Amos and most recently in Beru, religion remains a difficult subject
when discussing protecting LGBTQ rights. Further laws and rulings
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like the RFRA and Sherbert, with subsequent cases like Lobby,
might pose a difficult challenge to protecting such rights. It can be
determined that even with cases like Lobby and the RFRA, LGBTQ
employees should retain their right to work free of discrimination
inside a private religious-oriented business.

